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Abstract 
This study takes a new tack on the question of modernization and democracy, focused on the 
outcome of theoretical interest. We argue that economic development affects the electoral 
component of democracy but has minimal impact on other components of this diffuse concept. 
This is so because development (a) alters the power and incentives of top leaders and (b) 
elections provide a focal point for collective action. The theory is tested with two new datasets – 
Varieties of Democracy and Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy – that allow us to 
disaggregate the concept of democracy into meso- and micro-level indicators. Results of these 
tests corroborate the theory: only election-centered indices are correlated with economic 
development. This may help to account for apparent inconsistencies across extant studies and 
may also shed light on the mechanisms at work in a much-studied relationship.  
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Introduction 
In the heyday of modernization theory it was widely accepted that economic development would 
favor a democratic form of government (Lipset 1959). In subsequent decades, this thesis was 
severely challenged. Early on, Barrington Moore (1966) and Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) 
questioned the logic of the argument. More recent challenges focus on empirical relationships 
discernible from the crossnational data. Adam Przeworski and collaborators argue that richer 
countries are more likely to maintain democratic rule but that the initial transition to democracy 
is unrelated to a country’s level of economic development (Przeworski & Limongi 1997; 
Przeworski et al. 2000). Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson & Yared (hereafter AJRY) claim that 
even this relationship is spurious, disappearing once country fixed-effects are incorporated into 
statistical models (AJRY 2008, 2009; see also Alexander, Harding & Lamarche 2011; Moral-
Benito & Bartolucci 2012).1 Countering these challenges to the orthodoxy, others argue that the 
relationship between economic development and democracy is restored if historical data 
stretching back to the nineteenth century is incorporated or if different estimators are employed 
(Benhabib et al. 2011; Boix 2011; Boix & Stokes 2003; Che et al. 2013; Epstein et al. 2006; Faria 
et al. 2014; Treisman 2015).  
As things now stand, the modernization debate rests upon a complex set of modeling 
choices, e.g., which time-periods to include, how to overcome the censored nature of democracy 
indices, what temporal units of analysis to employ, what corresponding lag structure to adopt, 
whether to apply linear or non-linear models, and which dynamic models to employ. Left out of 
this long-running debate is any serious consideration of the outcome.  
A priori, there is no reason to expect the impact of economic development to be uniform 
across all dimensions of democracy (Aidt & Jensen 2012). Since democracy is a broad concept, 
open to many interpretations and operationalizations, the issue is non-trivial. We propose that 
the differential response of various aspects of democracy to changes in economic development, 
typically operationalized by per capita GDP, may help to account for the fragility of this 
relationship, as well as for the ongoing and seemingly irresolvable debate about possible 
mechanisms at work in the development-democracy nexus. Specifically, we argue that economic 
development primarily affects contested elections. Its impact on other aspects of democracy is 
much weaker, and perhaps nonexistent.  
Our explanation hinges on the incentives of leaders and the collective action dilemmas of 
citizens. We argue, first, that economic development enhances the power resources of citizens 
                                                
1 In this view, the correlation between income and democracy is the product of some unmeasured confounder that 
affects both income and democracy. 
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vis-à-vis leaders. We argue, second, that economic development affects the opportunity costs of 
a leader contemplating the prospect of relinquishing power. In rich countries these opportunity 
costs are lowered because leaders can obtain remunerative employment elsewhere. However, 
these shifts in opportunity costs and in the relative power resources of leaders versus citizens do 
not lead to more democratic institutions unless citizens are able to overcome their collective 
action dilemma. Elections, unlike other aspects of democracy, provide a focal point for collective 
action, allowing citizens to hold leaders accountable. This helps to explain why economic 
development is associated with the achievement of competitive elections but not with other 
institutions associated with democracy, which do not provide a convenient focal point for 
collective action.  
If our argument is correct, indices that lump several features of democracy together (e.g., 
Polity and Freedom House), as well as indices that focus on non-electoral elements of 
democracy (e.g., constitutionalism, civil liberties, participation, deliberation, political equality), 
will reveal a weak or attenuated empirical relationship to economic development. Only indices 
that are tightly focused on the electoral component of democracy should be strongly correlated 
with previous levels of economic development. 
Testing this set of hypotheses requires disaggregating the concept of democracy so that 
its component features can be separately examined. To do so we enlist two new datasets, 
Varieties of Democracy (“V-Dem”) (Coppedge et al. 2015) and the Lexical Index of Electoral 
Democracy (Skaaning, Gerring & Bartusevi ius 2015). With these new data sources, we conduct 
extensive empirical tests across a global sample of countries extending back over two centuries. 
These analyses support our contention that only indicators tightly focused on competitive multi-
party elections are robustly and positively associated with economic development. This finding 
not only helps to reconcile divergent results in the literature but also sheds new light on causal 
mechanisms that may be at work in this much-debated relationship.  
 In Section I, we present our theory. In Section II, we present the data and a benchmark 
model. In Section III, we probe the robustness of this result. In Section IV, we conduct head-to-
head contests between electoral and composite measures of democracy. In Section V, we 
disaggregate the key index of electoral democracy in order to analyze its component parts, 
allowing us another peak into the mechanisms that may be at work. In Section VI we distinguish 
between democratic upturns and downturns. Section VII concludes with a brief discussion of 
future directions for research on the modernization thesis. 
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I. Economic Development and Democracy 
What aspects of regime change are promoted by economic development? The question, so far as 
we can tell, is under-theorized and under-explored. Yet, democracy is a many-splendored 
concept. Although usually approached as a single entity, recent work distinguishes a variety of 
elements that may enable rule by the people. This includes electoral contestation, 
constitutionalism (horizontal accountability, rule of law, civil liberties), state capacity, 
participation, deliberation, and political equality (Coppedge & Gerring et al. 2011; Cunningham 
2002; Diamond & Morlino 2004; Held 2006; Munck 2015). Although these features are 
undoubtedly correlated, they are not perfectly correlated. Countries scoring high on one 
dimension may score low, or middling, on another (examples include early-19th century Britain 
and Apartheid South Africa, which both scored relatively high on contestation but low on 
participation). Consequently, it is plausible to suppose that economic development might impact 
some dimensions more strongly than others. 
We argue that economic development favors electoral aspects of democracy. To be clear, 
we are not proposing that economic development has no impact at all on the other factors listed 
above. What we are proposing is that this effect, if present, pales in comparison with the impact 
of economic development on free and fair elections. Our theoretical discussion thus focuses on 
explaining these differential effects rather than on factors that might apply broadly to all aspects 
of democracy. 
To facilitate this argument we distinguish two players: citizens (understood here as 
permanent residents of a sovereign territory, whether formally recognized by the state as citizens 
or not) and leaders (those who control the executive at a particular point in time along with their 
entourage of family, friends, and advisors). We provide a verbal account of the argument here. 
(Elsewhere, we construct a formalized version modelled as a sequential game with incomplete 
information between citizens and a leader that can manipulate different democratic rights 
[authors]). 
We assume, first, that citizens of a polity are more likely to prefer a democratic regime-
type than its leaders, other things being equal. Thus, while the preferences of both citizens and 
leaders may have evolved dramatically over the past two centuries (presumably, in a democratic 
direction), we assume that their relative preferences remain constant. Note that leaders may derive 
rents from controlling office (Rowley et al. 1988) as well as the intrinsic rewards inhering in 
power and status, all of which may incline them to prefer holding onto their positions even in 
the face of popular opposition. By contrast, surveys of mass publics generally show strong 
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support for democracy, especially when contrasted with other possible options (Chu et al. 2008; 
Inglehart 2003; Norris 2011).  
We assume, second, that economic development increases the relative power resources of 
citizens vis-à-vis leaders. A richer, better educated, more urbanized, more connected citizenry is, 
by virtue of these traits, more powerful (Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). 
There are many reasons for this, but all point to the idea that wealthier and better educated 
urbanites are in a better position to engage in oppositional activities (Glaeser et al. 2007). 
Although economic development may also enhance the power resources of leaders, leaders in 
poor countries are already in control of considerable resources, especially in autocratic states, 
where they are generally free to build up police power and to engage in predation (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003). Thus, we expect economic development to have a differential effect on the 
power resources of citizens and leaders, with citizens improving their relative position as a 
society develops. 
In addition to altering the relative power of citizens and leaders, economic development 
affects the direct costs and opportunity costs for a leader as s/he ponders whether to subvert electoral 
democracy (e.g., by not holding elections or committing electoral fraud). Note that the ideal of 
electoral democracy hinges upon the willingness of the current leader to relinquish office. If the 
incumbent is willing to hold an election and abide by its results electoral democracy stands a 
strong chance of succeeding. If not, electoral democracy cannot succeed, almost by definition. It 
follows that any factor affecting the direct costs and opportunity costs of a leader is highly 
relevant (Boix & Stokes 2003; Przeworski & Limongi 1997). 
Regarding direct costs, economic development increases the costs of electoral fraud. This 
is most obvious in the case of vote-buying, a common strategy of electoral fraud. Mired in 
poverty, even public-spirited citizens may sell their votes for a modest sum. Well-off citizens, by 
contrast, are less likely to do so, or will require larger payments. In rich countries, therefore, the 
direct costs associated with election manipulation are higher – even taking into account the 
enhanced resources available to a leader (or ruling party) in a rich society (Jensen & Justesen 
2014). Electoral fraud may also be less tolerated among wealthier, well-educated middle class 
citizens on ideological grounds (Aidt & Jensen 2012; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Stokes et al. 2013; 
Weitz-Shapiro 2013). 
A good deal of research suggests that the opportunity costs of a leader contemplating 
leaving office are also affected by economic development. In a poor country, jobs with the state 
are often one of the few sources of substantial income. Evidence for this proposition may be 
found by comparing the salaries of parliamentarians. In rich (OECD) countries, members of 
 
 
7 
parliament earn about three times the annual per capita income in their country, while in poor 
countries MPs earn about fourteen times the per capita income (Gerring, Oncel & Morrison 
2015). We can expect that the salary differential between rich and poor countries is at least 
equally big with respect to the salaries of executives, party leaders, and senior staff. A leader 
exiting office in a poor country may therefore have few options available by which to maintain 
the lifestyle to which he or she – and his/her coterie – has become accustomed. By contrast, in a 
rich society leaders who (voluntarily) leave office are likely to find ample sources of 
remuneration. They may serve on boards of directors, sell their services to consulting and 
lobbying firms, collect fees for writing and speaking, and so forth (Diermeier et al. 2005; Eggers 
& Hainmuller 2009). Many leaders find their financial opportunities enhanced after vacating their 
seat of power (Palmer & Schneer 2015).  
The anticipated payoffs from leaving office may influence a leader’s decision about 
whether or not to manipulate an election in order to ensure his/her hold on power, e.g., by vote-
buying, intimidation, or ballot-stuffing. Elections identified as manipulated clearly increase the 
risk of riots, demonstrations, revolutions, and coups (see, e.g., Beaulieu 2014; Tucker 2007; Wig 
& Rød 2015) – which, if successful, have dire personal consequences for leaders (see Goemans 
et al. 2011). These may be risks that leaders of poor countries are willing to take, given the high 
opportunity costs of exiting office. In rich countries, however, where former leaders can expect to 
assume well-paid private-sector jobs, a high-risk approach to maintaining office is probably less 
enticing. 
Hence, all else equal, a more developed economy (a) increases the power of citizens vis-à-
vis leaders and (b) changes the incentive structure for leaders, making less likely that they will 
cling to office by any means necessary. Even so, in order for citizens to affect the character of 
national institutions they must overcome collective action dilemmas (e.g., Medina 2007). Citizens 
cannot impose their will when operating alone but may do so when acting in concert. If citizens 
are able to coordinate, enhanced power resources at the individual level, attendant upon 
economic development, are likely to translate into sustained impact at a societal level. A critical 
feature distinguishing electoral institutions from other institutions is the role that elections play 
as a focal point for citizen action, mitigating collective action problems that would otherwise 
constrain popular mobilization.2 This feature acts as a protection against democratic backsliding, 
helping to ensure that electoral institutions, once established, are respected. 
                                                
2 On problems of collective action pertaining to democracy, see Chong (1991), Fearon (2011), and Weingast (1997). 
On the role of elections, and electoral fraud, as focal points, see Thompson & Kuntz (2005) and Tucker (2007). On 
focal points more generally see Schelling (1960). 
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The focal role of elections stems from five key features of the electoral process. First, 
elections are high-stake endeavors, authorizing governments to enact policies influencing the 
distribution of resources and the sanctioning of values. Second, they are highly visible. One can 
hardly hold an election in secret. Indeed, elections are likely to be intensively canvassed by the 
media and by informal networks (which may provide alternative sources of information if the 
official sources are biased). Third, actions that impair the quality of an election – e.g., widespread 
vote-buying, voter intimidation, denial of access to the ballot to a major party or candidate – are 
fairly easy to discern. Although clever leaders have developed subtle ways of manipulating 
elections (see Birch 2011; Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009; Lehoucq 2003; Schedler 2013; Simpser 
2013), gross infringements are hard to obscure. The most severe infringement upon the principle 
of free and fair elections – outright cancellation – is also the most visible. Fourth, elections occur 
across a short period of time and culminate in a single event, the announcement of a winner. At 
this point, when emotions are running high, it is natural for large numbers of people to mobilize 
if their preferences are not respected (see, e.g., Beaulieu 2014; Thompson & Kuntz 2005; Tucker 
2007). Mobilization is more likely if the will of the majority is denied, for then this majority 
enjoys the comfort and safety of numbers. Once a tipping point of engagement is reached – 
making it difficult for the police or army or para-military squads to control a crowd – peripheral 
actors may enter the fray with minimal risk (Bunce & Wolchik 2011; Beaulieu 2014; Kuran 1989; 
Lohmann 1994; Tucker 2007).  
These characteristics set elections apart from other aspects of democracy, and the 
prospect of collective action ought to make leaders think twice before manipulating them. By 
way of contrast, let us consider a non-electoral feature of democracy such as civil liberties. Leaders 
may infringe upon the right of free speech selectively, arresting only a few individuals at a time 
and allowing others to bask in (false) security. They may choose an opportune moment, when 
public attention is focused on another event of great salience (e.g., a natural disaster, 
international conflict, sporting event). They may even create the conditions for that moment by 
instigating a distracting event. They may also abridge civil liberties in a clandestine manner, e.g., 
through disappearances managed by para-military groups or private contracts, thus avoiding 
direct responsibility. Using various tools of repression, great damage may be done to the 
democratic ideal of civil liberty without a high level of public awareness and without a single 
galvanizing event that might prompt the general public to take action. Infringements of civil 
liberty – in contrast to elections – may be achieved stealthily, for there are no natural focal points. 
To reprise, we argue that economic development spurs democratization in the electoral 
realm, but not necessarily in other realms. This is so because the relative power resources of 
 
 
9 
citizens as well as the leaders’ direct costs and opportunity costs of repression are higher in more 
developed societies and because of the focal quality of elections, which helps citizens overcome 
collective action problems. All of these features should incentivize elected leaders to respect the 
election process and its results and should also provide citizens with an opportunity to shoo 
incumbents out of office if they fail to do so.  
Importantly, focal points operate only where elections are already in place. Otherwise, 
there is no event around which constituencies can mobilize. This suggests that economic 
development might have greater impact on the consolidation of electoral democracy (once 
elections are established) than on the initial transition to electoral rule, following a line of 
argument initiated by Przeworski and associates (Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski 2005). 
 
 
II. A Benchmark Model 
Our main hypothesis centers on a particular dimension of democracy which we have 
characterized as electoral and which we define narrowly as “clean multiparty elections.” Electoral 
democracy refers here to the quality of the electoral process itself, not the extent of participation 
in that election (i.e., suffrage or turnout). We expect that measures focused mainly on the 
electoral features of democracy will be strongly related to economic development, while 
measures focused on other aspects of democracy, as well as more comprehensive indices that 
include both electoral and non-electoral elements, will be only weakly related, or not at all related, 
to economic development.  
Following Lipset (1959), we shall assume that economic development involves a set of 
factors including income, industrialization (and attendant changes to class structure), changing 
sectoral composition, education, communications infrastructure, and urbanization. Since these 
factors are causally inter-related (in ways that would be difficult to model) and highly correlated 
(and hence difficult to disentangle), we adopt the usual expedient by which per capita GDP 
serves as a proxy for the composite concept of economic development. Our chosen indicator is 
drawn from the Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014), transformed by the natural 
logarithm. Following standard practice (Boix 2011; Treisman 2015), missing data within a time-
series is linearly interpolated. Robustness tests focused on urbanization are included in the 
appendix (Tables B20-B21). Other good proxies for economic development with long time 
series and extensive cross-country coverage are hard to identify. It should be noted that we are 
not concerned with short-term changes in per capita GDP, i.e., economic growth, or with 
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various factors sometimes associated with, but conceptually distinct from, economic 
development such as wealth distribution or violent conflict. 
There is no well-established benchmark model for testing the association between 
income and democracy, or other determinants of democracy for that matter (Gassebner et al. 
2012). Following Boix (2011) and AJRY (2009), we employ a high threshold test in our 
benchmark model because we want to minimize the possibility of spurious findings. The chosen 
model features an ordinary least squares estimator along with country and year fixed effects, a 
lagged dependent variable, and robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Right-side 
variables are lagged one period behind the outcome and data is analyzed annually. The 
benchmark specification is intentionally sparse, disregarding additional factors that might serve 
as potential confounders but might also introduce post-treatment confounding or greatly 
truncate the sample. Note that our models include a lengthy time-series, extending for more than 
100 years and in some cases up to two centuries, which should provide sufficient within-country 
information in a fixed-effects framework to mitigate the so-called Nickell bias (Nickell 1982).  
We begin by assembling indicators that focus on non-electoral components of democracy. 
This includes four meso-level indices from the V-Dem dataset that attempt to measure Liberal, 
Participatory, Deliberative, and Egalitarian components of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2011; 
2015a,b). Additional indices capitalize on the richness of V-Dem data to measure more specific 
aspects of democracy including Individual Liberty and Rule of Law, Judicial Constraints, 
Legislative Constraints, Free Expression, Alternative Sources of Information, Free Association, 
Executive Selection, and (de jure) Adult Suffrage. Detailed definitions of all variables used in this 
paper are located in Table A1 and descriptive statistics in Table A2. Note that all democracy 
measures are re-scaled to a 0-1 scale so that coefficients can be directly compared.  
Results of these initial tests are shown across the first row of Table 1. Among these 
twelve non-electoral indicators of democracy only Judicial Constraints is predicted (with the 
expected sign) by a country’s per capita GDP. Somewhat surprisingly, higher income predicts 
lower suffrage – a result that we suspect is spurious. 
Next, we examine a set of composite indices commonly used to measure democracy in 
its entirety (following different understandings of the concept). This includes Polity2 from the 
Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2014), the Unified Democracy Scores (“UDS”) from 
Pemstein et al. (2012), and the Political Rights and Civil Liberties indices from Freedom House 
(2014). While each of these indices has a somewhat different focus they are all highly aggregated, 
including a wide variety of underlying concepts and measures. Results of these tests, shown in 
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columns 13-16 in Table 1, suggest that democracy, considered in its entirety, is not clearly 
identified as a by-product of economic development.  
Of course, there are many additional issues to consider pertaining to samples (e.g., Boix 
2011), estimators (e.g., Heid et al. 2012), specifications (e.g., Boix & Stokes 2003), and other 
matters. These are taken up in the next section of the paper. However, the results shown here 
indicate that whatever relationship may exist between economic development and macro-indices 
of democracy is not especially strong. Thus far, the skeptical view of modernization theory, 
introduced at the outset, is upheld. 
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Table 1:  Varieties of Democracy 
 NON-ELECTORAL 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Outcome 
Liberal 
Component 
(V-Dem) 
Participatory 
Component 
(V-Dem) 
Deliberative 
Component 
(V-Dem) 
Egalitarian 
Component 
(V-Dem) 
Ind. Liberty 
Rule of Law 
(V-Dem) 
Judicial 
Constraints 
(V-Dem) 
Legislative 
Constraints 
(V-Dem) 
Free 
Expression 
(V-Dem) 
Alternative 
Information 
(V-Dem) 
Free 
Association 
(V-Dem) 
Executive 
Selection 
(V-Dem) 
Adult 
Suffrage 
(V-Dem) 
GDPpc(ln) 0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.004* 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.006 -0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Years 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
             
 COMPOSITE MOSTLY ELECTORAL PURELY ELECTORAL  
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21    
Outcome Polity2 
(Polity IV) 
UDS 
(Pemstein) 
Political 
Rights 
(FH) 
Civil 
Liberties 
(FH) 
BMR 
(Boix) 
Lexical 
(Skaaning) 
Electoral 
Contestation 
(V-Dem) 
Competitive 
Elections 
(Skaaning) 
Clean 
Elections 
(V-Dem) 
   
GDPpc(ln) 0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.007 0.010** 0.007** 0.013** 0.010***    
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)    
Years 211 62 37 37 207 211 111 211 111    
 
Ordinary least squares regression with lagged dependent variable, country and year fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Units 
of analysis: country-years.  Right-side variables measured at T-1.  Scales normalized to 0-1 (1=most democratic)  
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In the third section of Table 1 (“mostly electoral”) we examine indices that are focused 
primarily – but not exclusively – on the electoral component of democracy. We begin with the 
binary democracy indicator from Boix, Miller & Rosato (2013).1 Their measure (“BMR”) captures 
whether the legislature and executive are chosen (directly or indirectly) in free and fair elections in 
which at least a majority of adult men are enfranchised. Note that the inclusion of suffrage is the 
only departure from a purely electoral indicator (following our definition). Next, we examine the 
Lexical index (Skaaning et al. 2015), which is based on a cumulative aggregation of indicators 
capturing whether national elections are held, opposition parties are allowed to run, elections are 
competitive, and suffrage is inclusive. Again, the inclusion of a suffrage criterion is the only 
departure from a purely electoral measure. Finally, we employ an index of Electoral Contestation 
based on different V-Dem indicators including measures of Freedom of Association (including 
repression of political parties), Clean Elections, and Executive Selection. These are combined 
through multiplication based on the idea that they are necessary and mutually dependent 
conditions for contestation. Results from these tests are shown in columns 17-19 of Table 1. All 
electoral indices bear a positive relationship to economic development, though one (BMR) does 
not surpass the usual threshold of statistical significance. 
In the final section of Table 1 (“purely electoral”) we examine indicators that are tightly 
focused on electoral democracy. Competitive Elections focuses on the existence of competitive 
multi-party elections without any consideration of the extent of suffrage. Specifically, the index is 
coded 1 in any situation where the chief executive offices and seats in the effective legislative 
body are filled by multi-party elections characterized by uncertain outcomes – meaning that the 
elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to gain government power. 
Next, we measure Clean Elections, understood as the absence of registration fraud, systematic 
irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence. The 
index is formed from a Bayesian factor analysis of these component indicators, drawn from the 
V-Dem dataset. Note that Competitive Elections is a component of the ordinal Lexical index and 
Clean Elections is a component of Electoral Contestation. These narrower indices are thus nested 
within the broader indices that we classified as “mostly electoral.” Results of these final tests, 
                                                
1 It rather closely follows (except for including the participation criterion and some adjustments on how to capture 
the contestedness of elections) an earlier formulation provided by Przeworski and colleagues (Przeworski et al. 2000), 
subsequently known as the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) measure (Cheibub et al. 2010). We do not include DD 
here, due to its shorter time series (post-WWII). However, when running tests on similar samples, we do find that 
BMR is somewhat more strongly related to income than DD. One plausible explanation of this is the stronger weight 
put on observed government alternation. Knutsen and Wig (2015) show that young democracies with strong 
economic performances are more likely to be misclassified as dictatorships by DD, which could lead to attenuation 
bias also when using DD to test the modernization thesis. 
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shown in columns 20-21 of Table 1, support our argument, as they are all strongly correlated with 
prior levels of per capita GDP.  
To get a sense of the estimated size of the (long-term) causal effect, Figure 1 plots the 
marginal effect of logged GDP per capita on the long-run predicted equilibrium level of the 
Clean Elections index based on our benchmark model – Model 1, Table 3. Since our benchmark 
includes a lagged dependent variable, the coefficient for income only reveal the short-term (yearly) 
effect – 0.010 for each unit increase in logged income. The long-run effect, however, is 0.010/(1-
0.881), where 0.881 is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, which amounts to roughly 
0.080 on the 0-1 Clean Elections index (with a standard error of 0.032). This effect is plotted in 
Figure 1, surrounded by 95% confidence intervals.2  
 
Figure 1:  Long-run Effects 
 
 
Long-run effects of economic development (proxied by per capita GDP) on electoral democracy (proxied by Clean 
Elections). 
 
                                                
2 The standard errors of the long-run coefficient are calculated using the nlcom command in Stata 13. They are very 
similar but slightly larger than those from a Bewley-transformation (De Boef and Keele 2008), where the lag of the 
dependent variable is used to instrument for its change. The same goes for the long-run equilibrium levels, where the 
root mean squared error (RMSE) based on the standard errors from Table 1, Model 21, scaled by (1-0.881), yields a  
slightly larger estimate than the RMSE from the Bewley tansformation. Figure 1 is based on this slightly more 
conservative estimate of the RMSE, arrived at through the margins and marginsplot commands in Stata 13. 
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To put this in perspective, an extremely poor country, at $250 USD per capita GDP, is 
expected to hover around 0.23 on the Clean Elections index – approximately the level observed 
in Mexico under the PRI in the 1980s. Quadrupling that income level, to $1000 USD, the 
expected long-run level of Clean Elections rises to 0.34 – equivalent to the status of Kenya after 
Arap Moi (but prior to 2007). A median income country by 2010’s standards, at roughly $7300 
USD per capita, is expected to score around the 0.5 midpoint of the Clean Elections scale – 
corresponding (roughly) to Ghana in the late 1990’s. Given the secular-historical rise of the world 
economy, these results suggest that economic development brings with it a substantial shift in the 
quality of elections. 
 
 
III. Additional Tests 
We have demonstrated that measures narrowly focused on the electoral component of 
democracy are more closely associated with changes in per capita GDP than non-electoral 
measures or composite indices that include electoral and non-electoral elements. But, we have 
tested only one format: ordinary least squares with a lagged dependent variable, country and year 
fixed effects, and clustered standard errors. In this section, we explore alternate estimators, 
samples, and specifications. Our attention is focused on Competitive Elections and Clean 
Elections since they are narrowly targeted on the concept of theoretical interest. (A similar battery 
of robustness tests is also conducted on other indices, with results shown in Appendix B.)  
 Table 2 focuses on Competitive Elections. Model 1 replicates our initial test – Model 20 
from Table 1. Subsequent models introduce variations in this benchmark. Model 2 excludes the 
lagged dependent variable. Model 3 substitutes a trend variable for annual dummies. Model 4 
includes a number of control variables that, following the literature, may affect a country’s 
regime-type: Corruption (Birch 2011), Land Inequality (Ansell & Samuels 2014), neighbor 
Diffusion (Brinks & Coppedge 2006), Internal Conflict and External Conflict (Reuveny & Li 
2003), Natural Resources (Ross 2001). Descriptions of these variables and their sources can be 
found in Table A1. 
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Table 2:  Competitive Elections 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year MI Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.013** 0.148*** 0.104*** 0.022* 0.167***  0.064*** 0.040*** 0.187** 
 (0.005) (0.036) (0.035) (0.011) (0.048)  (0.020) (0.008) (0.090) 
GDPpc (ln)       0.165***    
   L20      (.047)    
Lagged Y 0.890***   0.840***   0.578*** 0.544***  
 (0.009)   (0.012)   (0.031) (0.031)  
Trend   0.002***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    -0.090*** -0.775***     
       (0.031) (0.172)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000**     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    2.108** 10.488**     
    (0.926) (4.644)     
Internal     0.008 -0.020     
   Conflict    (0.010) (0.034)     
External     -0.007 -0.039     
   Conflict    (0.008) (0.034)     
Natural     0.000 0.000     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.002)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 157 157 157 132 132 158 156 216 136 
Years 211 211 211 99 99 193 42 213 191 
Obs 12947 13081 13081 6683 6695 12053 2509 23445 9610 
R2 (within) 0.849 0.287 0.239 0.765 0.237 0.289 0.521 0.628 0.252 
Cragg-Donald             156.1 
 
Outcome: Competitive Elections.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares, with standard errors clustered by country), 
IV (instrumental variable, results from second stage).  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available 
data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data 
imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted.  
Right-side variables measured at T-1. 
 
Model 5 repeats this specification without the lagged dependent variable. Model 6 returns 
to the benchmark model but lags per capita GDP two decades behind the outcome. Model 7 
reconstructs the annual panel as a five-year panel (after converting variables to 5-year moving 
averages). Given the sluggish nature of right- and left-side variables, this might be regarded as a 
more plausible formulation. Model 8 imputes missing data with the Amelia II algorithm (Honaker 
& King 2010), extending our benchmark sample with an additional 10,000+ observations. Model 
9 presents the second stage of an instrumental variables analysis, where (following Acemoglu et al. 
2008), instruments are constructed by using the weighted income of trading partners to capture 
exogenous international shocks to domestic income. 
All tests shown in Table 2 reveal a positive relationship between per capita GDP and 
Competitive Elections. Remarkably, all robustness tests suggest a stronger relationship between 
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these two variables – judging solely by coefficient estimates – than in our benchmark model 
(reproduced as Model 1 in Table 2), although coefficients are not directly comparable across 
dynamic and non-dynamic models.  
The tests in Table 2 apply an ordinary least squares estimator, a choice that might seem 
odd given the binary outcome of interest. OLS provides ease of interpretation, computational 
simplicity (allowing for unit and time fixed effects along with annual data), and consistency with 
estimators used for other outcomes (e.g., in Table 1 and Appendix B). Moreover, a linear-
probability model provides a sensible estimate of the conditional expectation function without 
relying heavily on assumptions about the distribution of the error term to produce estimates, as 
do logit, probit, and other maximum-likelihood models. Granted, the assumptions required for its 
use are more plausible in settings where the treatment is randomly assigned (Angrist & Pischke 
2009: 94-107). To relieve concerns, tests in Table 2 (except the multiple-imputation and 
instrumental-variable models) are replicated with a logit estimator. Results, shown in Table B22, 
corroborate OLS estimates. 
Table 3 focuses on Clean Elections. Model 1 again replicates our initial test from Table 1. 
Subsequent models introduce variations in this benchmark, following the template of Table 2 but 
with a few variations, as discussed below. 
Clean Elections is a continuous variable, so there is no need to introduce non-linear 
estimators. However, the variable presents an uneven distribution, with multiple values at the left 
bound of 0, representing a non-electoral regime. To assure that reported results are not solely the 
product of an electoral transition (from no elections to elections), Model 7 in Table 3 replicates 
the benchmark model with a sub-sample of observations in which an electoral regime was in 
place (elections were on course). 
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Table 3:  Clean Elections 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS IV 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Y>0 5-year 5-year MI Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
GDPpc (ln) 0.010*** 0.100*** 0.074*** 0.015** 0.119***  0.011*** 0.034** 0.083*** 0.009*** 0.116** 
 (0.004) (0.026) (0.026) (0.006) (0.030)  (0.003) (0.014) (0.015) (0.003) (0.058) 
GDPpc (ln)       0.083**      
   L20      (0.037)      
Lagged Y 0.879***   0.837***   0.953*** 0.579*** 0.643*** 0.741***  
 (0.010)   (0.015)   (0.006) (0.034) (0.060) (0.022)  
Trend   0.002***         
   (0.000)         
Corruption     -0.103*** -0.688***       
   Index    (0.021) (0.108)       
Land     -0.000** -0.000**       
  Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)       
Diffusion    0.676 4.189       
    (0.500) (2.787)       
Internal     -0.001 -0.008       
  Conflict    (0.005) (0.015)       
External     -0.001 -0.027       
  Conflict    (0.005) (0.018)       
Natural     -0.000 -0.000       
  Resources    (0.000) (0.001)       
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 149 152 152 205 130 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 111 22 22 114 92 
Obs 11271 11375 11375 6630 6649 10439 8560 2211 2211 21143 7789 
R2 (within) 0.847 0.320 0.262 0.818 0.417 0.351 0.863 0.549  0.853 0.189 
Cragg-Donald           127.6 
 
Outcome: Clean Elections index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), 
IV (instrumental variables, second stage), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  
Sample: Full (all available data), Y>0 (scores for Clean Elections that surpass 0), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year 
intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation 
algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted.  Right-side variables measured at T-1.   
 
The continuous nature of Clean Elections allows for the use of a system generalized 
method of moments estimator (Blundell & Bond 1998), reported in Model 9 of Table 3. This 
version of GMM is regarded as appropriate for studying sluggish variables. We follow a standard 
approach for GMM models with long time series in re-coding annual data at five-year intervals 
(as in Model 8). This reduces the number of time series units and thus the number of instruments, 
and allows for valid identification (following the assumptions of the model). We enter income 
and the lagged dependent variable as endogenous and allow two lags for instrumentation. This 
yields 145 instruments, below the number of cross-sectional units (153), which is the rule-of-
thumb threshold (Roodman 2009). The Ar(2) test p-value is .56 and the Hansen J-test p-value 
is .39, suggesting that Model 9 provides consistent estimates (this holds also for other GMM 
specifications that we tested).  
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Overall, the results for Clean Elections are highly robust. Across eleven models shown in 
Table 3, per capita GDP is related to higher-quality elections in every test, surpassing standard 
thresholds of significance. As with Competitive Elections, we find that robustness tests generally 
show an enhanced relationship between these two factors relative to the benchmark model (Model 
1). 
Since economic development is a protean concept, amenable to many operationalizations, 
it is possible that these results may reflect some peculiarity of this particular indicator, drawn 
from the Maddison project. To alleviate this concern, we replicate the battery of tests in Tables 2 
and 3 using Urbanization rather than national income as the key predictor. (Urbanization, the 
share of population living in cities, is the main alternative to per capita GDP if one requires a 
measure of economic development with good historical coverage.) Results, shown in Tables B20-
21, are generally robust. 
At this point, we have subjected two indicators of central theoretical concern – 
Competitive Elections and Clean Elections – to a litany of empirical tests. But alternatives to 
these two measures have been tested in only one format, our benchmark model. This incongruity 
is remedied in a series of tables in Appendix B, where tests contained in Tables 2-3 are replicated 
for alternate measures of democracy. The general picture that emerges from this interrogation 
confirms the initial findings presented in Table 1. Non-electoral indicators of democracy, with the 
notable exception of Judicial Constraints, are not well-predicted (in the expected direction) by per 
capita GDP (Tables B1-B12). Nor are composite indices (Tables B13-B16). By contrast, indices 
that focus mostly on the electoral component of democracy are consistently predicted by a lagged 
measure of per capita GDP (Tables B17-B19). Indeed, Lexical and Electoral Contestation prove 
to be almost as robust as our “purely electoral” indicators (Competitive Elections and Clean 
Elections).  
The general picture emerging from all these tests is that the relationship between 
economic development and democracy is dependent on an electoral connection. The more 
closely an indicator homes in on the purely electoral component of democracy the more sensitive 
it is to changes in economic development. 
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IV. Head-to-Head Contests 
Measures of democracy are highly correlated, as many studies have pointed out. As such, one 
must be wary of over-interpreting fine differences in performance across indicators of very 
similar latent concepts – each of which, we must presume, is affected by potential measurement 
error. One approach to this problem is to include both measures in the same model so that 
partial effects (the impact of X controlling for Z) can be calculated. In our setting, this common 
strategy is more complicated since we are comparing rival measures of the outcome (Y) rather 
rival measures of a causal factor. Even so, the strategy of testing rival hypotheses head-to-head in 
the same model is viable.  
Table 4:  Head-to-Head Contests 
Outcome Competitive Elections 
Clean 
Elections Polity2 
 1 2 3 4 
GDPpc (ln) 0.065*** 0.085*** 0.006 -0.046** 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) 
Polity2 0.940*** 0.485***   
 (0.042) (0.028)   
Competitive Elections   0.461***  
      (0.024)  
Clean Elections    0.802*** 
    (0.045) 
Country FE ü ü ü ü 
Year FE ü ü ü ü 
Countries 155 149 155 149 
Years 211 112 211 112 
Obs 12543 9739 12543 9739 
R2 (within) 0.599 0.581 0.632 0.537 
 
Ordinary least squares regression with country and year fixed effects, standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, 
***.01 (two-sided tests). Right-side variables measured at T-1. Units of analysis: country-years.  
 
In Table 4, we build on the benchmark model to test electoral measures of democracy – 
Competitive Elections and Clean Elections – against the most common composite measure of 
democracy, Polity2. In Model 1, Competitive Elections is regressed on per capita GDP along 
with Polity2 plus country and year fixed effects. In Model 2, the analysis is replicated with Clean 
Elections as the outcome indicator. In both analyses, the relationship between per capita GDP 
and electoral democracy is robust, even when “controlling” for a composite measure of 
democracy on the right side of the model. Models 3 and 4 repeat this exercise in reverse. Here, 
Polity2 forms the outcome while Competitive elections and Clean elections serve as the controls. 
Here, the result does not survive. Indeed, the relationship turns negative in Model 4. 
 
 
21 
 The set of results presented in Table 4 offers further evidence of our claim that the 
relationship between economic development and democracy is not evenly distributed across all 
aspects of democracy. Composite indices such as Polity2 are not robust to the inclusion of 
electoral democracy, while measures of electoral democracy are robust to the inclusion of a 
composite measure. 
 
 
V. Inside the Box 
The Clean Elections index offers a unique opportunity to peak inside the box of an intriguing 
relationship. Note that this index is composed of eight variables, each of which is measured 
separately in the V-Dem dataset. By testing our benchmark model with each of these outcome 
variables (separately) we may gain additional insight into the causal mechanisms at work in this 
relationship. 
 Four indicators tap into problems of electoral integrity that may be characterized as 
violence or fraud. Government intimidation inquires whether opposition candidates, parties, or 
campaign workers were subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the 
government, the ruling party, or their agents. Other violence asks whether the campaign period, 
election day, and post-election process were free from other types of violence related to the 
conduct of the election and the campaign. Vote buying inquires into evidence of vote and/or 
turnout buying in an election. This refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, 
families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote, or whom to vote 
for. Other irregularities refers to other irregularities on the part of incumbent and/or opposition 
parties. Specific examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-
stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. We have strong theoretical reasons to 
believe that these factors are affected by the incentives of leaders and the relative power of 
leaders and citizens, which in turn are responsive to economic development, as articulated in 
Section I. 
 Three of the indicators that compose the Clean Elections index measure the capability of 
a state to manage the election process. Voter registry asks whether there was a reasonably accurate 
voter registry in place at the time of an election and whether it was in fact utilized. EMB capacity 
measures whether the Electoral Management Body in charge of administering national elections 
has sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election. EMB autonomy 
measures the ability of the Election Management Body to apply election laws and administrative 
rules impartially in national elections, separate from pressures exerted by the government or 
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governing party. While it is plausible to suppose that economic development might enhance state 
capacity, this lies outside the ambit of our theory. Thus, we have no strong priors on the 
relationship of these variables to per capita GDP. 
The final indicator comprising the Clean Elections index is Free and fair elections. This 
provides a summary judgment of whether – taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election 
day, and post-election process into account – the national election was free and fair. It does not 
consider the extent of suffrage but only the fairness of an election for those who are entitled to 
vote. We regard this as an overall measure of electoral democracy, and hence falling within the 
ambit of our theoretical framework. 
 In Table 5, we regress each of these outcomes on per capita GDP in our benchmark 
model (lagged dependent variable, country and year fixed effects, and clustered standard errors). 
Not all of these variables pass standard tests of statistical significance, suggesting that the meso-
level concept – Clean Elections – is more responsive to economic development than several of its 
components. This could be a product of measurement error, which is generally minimized when 
a variety of measures are combined in a single index. Note also that these components may 
perform a substitutive function. When leaders clamp down on (or open up to) electoral 
democracy they may prioritize one or the other of these factors, leading to variability across time 
and across countries that serves as noise in the crossnational estimator. For incumbents wanting 
to manipulate election results, picking one option from the “menu of manipulation” may be 
sufficient for ensuring election victory (Schedler 2002). For instance, leaders could opt either to 
stuff ballot boxes or to use party thugs to deter opposition members from voting in the first place; 
these strategies act as substitutes. 
Table 5:  Clean Elections, Disaggregated 
 Fraud & Violence Capacity General 
Outcome Government Intimidation 
Other 
Violence 
Vote 
Buying 
Other 
Irregularities 
Voter 
Registry 
EMB 
Capacity 
EMB 
Autonomy 
Free 
& Fair 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
GDPpc (ln) 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.012 -0.003 0.007 0.029*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Lagged Y 0.924*** 0.901*** 0.917*** 0.918*** 0.910*** 0.960*** 0.950*** 0.914*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Countries 152 152 152 152 152 151 151 152 
Years 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Obs 11271 11271 11271 11271 11271 11227 11230 11271 
R2 (within) 0.869 0.839 0.858 0.856 0.879 0.952 0.937 0.855 
 
Outcomes: components of the Clean Elections index.  Ordinary least squares regression with country and year fixed 
effects, standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Right-side variables measured at T-
1. Units of analysis: country-years.   
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Even so, it is worth comparing those indicators that pass our threshold test to those that 
do not. In line with our expectations, Table 5 shows that all indicators associated with electoral 
violence and fraud bear a strong relationship to economic development (Models 1-4) while 
indicators of state capacity do not (Models 5-7). The overall measure of election quality – Free 
and Fair – is also strongly correlated with per capita GDP, though this result does not help in 
disentangling causal mechanisms as it rests at roughly the same level of aggregation as our 
summary index (Clean Elections).  
This set of tests provides additional fodder for our argument that a richer economy 
empowers citizens to deter leaders from engaging in blatant manipulation of elections and 
weakens the incentives of leaders to do so. By contrast, other aspects of election quality that 
derive more from state capacity bear little relationship to per capita income. Even when we 
disaggregate the index of theoretical interest we find that the “electoral connections” theory 
makes accurate predictions. 
 
 
VI. Upturns and Downturns 
Finally, we investigate whether the relationship between income and electoral democracy is 
symmetric or asymmetric. Does economic development affect the probability of upturns 
(transitions to greater democracy, aka “democratization”) as well as of downturns (to greater 
autocracy, aka “democratic survival”), as argued by Boix (2011), Boix & Stokes (2003), and 
Epstein et al. (2006)? Or does it only affect the probability of downturns, as argued by 
Przeworski and colleagues (Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski 2005)? 
According to our theory, elections cannot serve as focal points in a non-elective regime. 
Where the established method for selecting leaders is by appointment or inheritance, there is no 
recognized event that might galvanize opposition at a single point in time. Thus, we expect that 
the impact of economic development is asymmetric – assisting in the consolidation of an 
electoral regime but not (or only minimally) in the initial transition to an electoral regime. 
To analyze this question we return to our preferred measures of electoral democracy – 
Competitive Elections and Clean Elections – along with a third measure that registers the 
existence of an Electoral Regime (a regime in which regular elections are on course). Units of 
analysis are comprised of election-years, as previously. But we also conduct tests with elections as 
the units of analysis. (Recall that annual data is generated from election data by filling in non-
election years with scores from the previous election – unless there is an interruption in the 
electoral regime, in which case the period of interruption is coded as 0). 
 
 
24 
Following Boix (2011: 822), we run two regressions for each dependent variable to 
differentiate movements in either direction (toward, or away from, democracy). The “Up” model 
re-codes the outcome to register instances of positive change since the previous year, setting all 
cases of no change or negative change to zero. The “Down” model re-codes the outcome to 
register instances of negative change since the previous year, setting all cases of no change or 
positive change to zero. By comparing the coefficients on GDP across these two regressions we 
can differentiate the influence of economic development on democratization and on backsliding 
(away from the democratic ideal).  
Table 6:  Upturns and Downturns 
Outcome Competitive Elections Electoral Regime Clean Elections Clean Elections 
Sample 1801-2011 1901-2011 1901-2011 1901-2011 
Units Country-year Country-year Country-year Election-year 
Direction Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
GDPpc (ln) 0.004 0.009*** -0.008 0.012*** 0.002 0.008*** -0.002 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) 
Lagged Y -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.139*** -0.054*** -0.084*** -0.037*** -0.110*** -0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.016) (0.010) 
Countries 157 157 156 156 152 152 149 149 
Years/elections 211 211 111 111 111 111 56 56 
Obs 12947 12970 11792 11797 11271 11283 2720 2723 
R2 (within) 0.047 0.051 0.110 0.031 0.076 0.029 0.090 0.089 
 
Ordinary least squares regression with country and year fixed effects, standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, 
***.01 (two-sided tests).  Right-side variables measured at T-1.   
• “Up” (toward greater democracy): !!,!! = !! ∗ !!!! + !! ∗ !"#!!! + !! + !! + !!,!, where D is the democracy 
measure (dependent variable), and !!,!! = max (!! ,!!!!). 
• “Down” (avoiding backsliding): !!,!! = !! ∗ !!!! + !! ∗ !"#!!! + !! + !! + !!,!, where !!,!! = min (!! ,!!!!). 
• !! and !! are country-and year-fixed effects. 
 
Results from these analyses, shown in Table 6, clearly support the asymmetric 
hypothesis.3 Higher income discourages downturns but does not encourage upturns. This is so 
regardless of whether we focus on dichotomous measures – Competitive Elections (Models 1-2) 
and Electoral Regime (Models 3-4) – or the more fine-grained Clean Elections index (Models 5-8). 
It is so regardless of whether the sample includes the twentieth century only (Models 3-8) or the 
entire modern period (Models 1-2). And, it is so regardless of whether years (Models 5-6) or 
elections (Models 7-8) provide the units of analysis. (The latter tests suggest that the asymmetric 
relationship is not solely the product of electoral interruptions, which are not included in the 
                                                
3 Coefficients on the lagged dependent variable in Table 6 are negative because these models look at change in the 
dependent variable as the outcome, as opposed to the other tests in this paper where current level is the dependent 
variable. 
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election-year panel analysis.) In other words, as per capita GDP rises it becomes less likely that 
election quality will deteriorate.4 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Since democracy is a diffuse, multi-dimensional concept it stands to reason that if economic 
development affects democracy, the causal connections are likely to be stronger for some aspects 
of democracy than for others. Only by disaggregating the concept can this crucial issue be 
addressed.  
 In this study, we find that the relationship between economic development and 
democracy is robust only with respect to the electoral component of democracy, narrowly 
construed as the existence of competitive national elections and the procedural integrity of the 
electoral process. Other aspects of democracy such as those associated with the participatory, 
deliberative, liberal, and egalitarian ideals or with state capacity are not related, or are only weakly 
related, to national income and its correlates (e.g., urbanization). This may help to explain why 
empirical tests employing composite indices such as Polity2 or Freedom House show inconsistent 
results, leading to a long and seemingly irresolvable debate over modernization theory, referenced 
at the outset. We also find that while economic development prevents democratic backsliding it 
does not show a significant relationship to democratization, corroborating the thesis of 
asymmetric effects (Przeworski et al. 2000). 
 As part of the contribution of this study, we propose a theoretical framework to explain 
the differential effects of economic development on democracy. This framework, presented in 
Section I, suggests that economic development reduces the relative power and alters the utility 
calculus of leaders, who are in a position to respect or subvert multi-party elections. In a 
developed society, the direct costs of subversion (e.g., through vote-buying) are raised while the 
opportunity costs of leaving office are lowered (by virtue of offering remunerative 
nongovernmental career options). Likewise, the focal role of elections provides a coordination 
mechanism for citizens who wish to see the will of the people respected. All of these mechanisms 
are election-centered, having little applicability to other elements of democracy or to state 
capacity (often viewed as a facilitating condition of democracy).  
 This explanation is put forth in a stipulative fashion, based on extant studies, and is 
consistent with the evidence presented here. However, the mechanisms are not directly measured 
                                                
4 However, Models 3-4 indicates that there is also an ‘interruptions/coup effect’; income does not incur the 
introduction of elections, but it decreases the chances of electoral interruptions (coups, autogolpes, etc.). 
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and tested. Future research should aim to get further inside the box so as to show the micro-level 
connections between economic development and improved prospects for democracy. 
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APPENDIX A:  Data 
Table A1:  Variable Definitions 
Democracy Indices 
Polity2 (Polity IV). Measures the extent to which democratic or autocratic “authority patterns” are institutionalized 
in a given country. It takes into account how the executive is selected, the degree of checks on executive power, and 
the form of political competition (Marshall et al. 2014). polity2 
UDS (Pemstein). A democracy index comprised of multiple indicators and aggregated through a Bayesian IRT 
measurement model (Pemstein et al. 2010). uds_mean 
Political Rights (FH). An annual comparative assessment of political rights based on a 1 to 7 scale (Freedom 
House 2014). fh_pr 
Civil Liberties (FH). An annual comparative assessment of civil liberties based on a 1 to 7 scale (Freedom House 
2014). fh_cl 
Liberal Component (V-Dem). The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting 
individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model 
takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on 
government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, 
and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. This index is formed by 
averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the 
executive (v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon). v2x_liberal 
Participatory Component (V-Dem). The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by 
citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice 
of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever 
practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society 
organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. This index is formed by averaging the following 
indices: civil society participation (v2x_cspart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power 
(v2xel_locelec), and elected regional government power(v2xel_regelec). v2x_partip 
Deliberative Component (V-Dem). The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which 
decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common 
good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, 
or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There 
should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and 
competent participants who are open to persuasion. To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the 
extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their 
positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of 
consultation is at elite levels. The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model 
including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), 
respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of consultation (v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage). 
v2xdl_delib 
Egalitarian Component (V-Dem). The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political 
power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy 
emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. 
Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, 
protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not 
exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance 
political equality. The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including 
indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position (v2pepwrses), power distribution according to 
social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to education 
(v2peedueq), equal access to health (v2pehealth), power distribution according to gender (v2pepwrgen), share of 
budget allocated to public/common goods (v2dlencmps), and the share of welfare programs that provide universal 
rather than means-tested benefits (v2dlunivl). v2x_egal 
Individual Liberty/Rule of Law (V-Dem). To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and 
public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, 
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freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion? The index is 
formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and 
impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to 
justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), 
freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women 
(v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), and freedom of 
domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew). v2xcl_rol 
Judicial Constraints (V-Dem). To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court 
rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion? The index is formed by taking the 
point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution 
(v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court 
independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind). v2x_jucon 
Legislative Constraints (V-Dem). To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (e.g., comptroller 
general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the 
executive? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators 
for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in 
practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart). v2xlg_legcon 
Free Expression (V-Dem). To what extent does government respect press & media freedom, the freedom of 
ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and 
cultural expression? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the 
indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), internet censorship effort (v2mecenefi), harassment 
of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, 
v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree). v2x_freexp 
Alternative Sources of Information (V-Dem). To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack 
of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of 
political perspectives? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of 
the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media 
perspectives (v2merange). v2xme_altinf 
Free Association (V-Dem). To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to 
participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely? The 
index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban 
(v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty 
(v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections 
indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods (as 
defined by v2x_elecreg). v2x_frassoc_thick 
Executive Selection (V-Dem). Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or 
indirectly)? There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, 
all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected (a=1) or not (a=0). 
Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected (b), measured as the proportion of legislators elected 
(if legislature is unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the weight 
defined by which house is dominant (if legislature is bicameral). Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the 
legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state (c1=1, otherwise 
0).  Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is 
necessary for the appointment of the head of government (c2=1, otherwise 0). Fifth, whether the head of 
government is appointed by the head of state (d=1) or not (d=0). Sixth, whether the head of government is directly 
elected (e=1) or not (e=0). Define hosw as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of 
government (v2exhoshog==1), hosw=1. If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the 
appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then hosw=1; if the reverse is true, hosw=0. If they share equal 
power, hosw=.5. Define the weight for the head of government as hogw=1-hosw. v2x_accex 
Adult Suffrage (V-Dem). What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national 
elections? This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted 
for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in 
practice (de facto). The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population 
as of January 1 in a particular year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of 
independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded 
as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 
0%. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, 
 
 
35 
electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the 
changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, 
literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or ‘economic independence’), estimates have been calculated by 
combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age 
distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and – 
in the case of very poor information – the conditions in similar countries or colonies. v2x_suffr 
BMR (Boix et al.). Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded 
democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of 
suffrage (Boix, Miller & Rosato, 2013). e_mibmr 
Lexical (Skaaning et al.). A lexical index of electoral democracy based on six conditions and seven levels: (L0) no 
elections; (L1) no-party or one-party elections; (L2) multiparty elections for legislature; (L3) multiparty elections for 
legislature and executive; (L4) minimally competitive, multiparty elections for legislature and executive; (L5) 
minimally competitive, multiparty elections with full male or female suffrage for legislature and executive; and (L6) 
minimally competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage for legislature and executive (Skaaning et al. 
2015). lexical_scale 
Competitive Elections (Skaaning et al.). An index of electoral competition coded 1 in any situation where the 
chief executive offices and seats in the effective legislative body are filled by multi-party elections characterized by 
uncertain outcomes – meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to gain 
government power (Skaaning et al. 2015). competitive_elections 
Electoral Contestation (V-Dem). An index of electoral contestation, which combines, through multiplication, 
measures of Freedom of Assocation (v2x_frassoc_thick), Clean Elections (v2xel_frefair), and Executive Selection 
(v2x_accex). v2x_contest 
Clean Elections (V-Dem). To what extent are elections free and fair? Free and fair connotes an absence of 
registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election 
violence. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators 
for EMB Autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB Capacity (v2elembcap), Election Voter Registry (v2elrgstry), Election Vote 
Buying (v2elvotbuy), Election Other Voting Irregularities (v2elirreg), Election Government Intimidation (v2elintim), 
Election Other Electoral Violence (v2elpeace), and Election Free and Fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these 
indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime 
periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg). v2xel_frefair 
Components of Clean Elections index 
Government Intimidation (V-Dem). In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign 
workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their 
agents? Responses: (0) Yes: the  repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the 
entire period was quiet; (1) Yes, frequent:  there was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of 
the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period; (2) Yes, some: there was periodic, not 
systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated – harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or 
its agents; (3) Restrained: there were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or 
its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups; 
(4) None: there was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the 
election campaign period and polling day. v2x_elintim 
Other Violence (V-Dem). In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election 
process free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the 
conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)? Responses: (0) 
No: there was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense 
period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country; it resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced 
refugees; (1) Not really: there were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond 
limited parts of the country; a few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move 
temporarily; (2) Somewhat: there were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part 
of the country; the number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small; (3) Almost: there were only a few 
instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured; (4) Peaceful: 
no election-related violence between civilians occurred. v2x_elpeace 
Vote Buying (V-Dem). In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying? Responses: (0) 
Yes: there was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and 
candidates; (1) Yes, some: there were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some 
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parts of the country or by one or a few parties; (2) Restricted: money and/or personal gifts were distributed by 
parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an ‘entry-ticket’ expectation and less about actual 
vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded; (3) Almost none: there was 
limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country; in all, 
they probably affected less than a few percent of voters; (4) None: there was no evidence of vote/turnout buying. 
v2x_elvotbuy 
Other Irregularities (V-Dem). In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by 
incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud? Responses: (0) Yes: there were systematic and almost 
nationwide other irregularities; (1) Yes, some: there were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, 
even if only in some parts of the country; (2) Sporadic: there were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, 
and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups; (3) Almost none: there were only a 
limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access 
to participation; (4) None: there was no evidence of intentional other irregularities; unintentional irregularities 
resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred. v2x_elirreg 
Voter Registry (V-Dem). In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it 
used? Responses: (0) No: there was no registry, or the registry was not used; (1) No: there was a registry but it was 
fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome 
could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation); (2) Uncertain: there was a registry but it 
is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes; (3) Yes, somewhat: the 
registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and 
impersonation could not have affected the results significantly; (4) Yes: the voter registry was reasonably accurate 
(less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion. v2x_elrgstry 
EMB Capacity (V-Dem). Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to 
administer a well-run national election? Responses: (0) No: there are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other 
resources affecting the organization across the territory; (1) Not really: deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless 
seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country; (2) 
Ambiguous: there might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a 
product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB; (3) Mostly: there are 
partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread; (4) Yes: the EMB has adequate staff and 
other resources to administer a well-run election. v2elembcap 
EMB Autonomy (V-Dem). Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to 
apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections? Responses: (0) No: the EMB is 
controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body; (1) Somewhat: the EMB has 
some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to 
the de facto ruling body; (2) Ambiguous: the EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what 
extent this influences the outcome of the election; (3) Almost: the EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all 
the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of 
elections; (4) Yes: the EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules. v2elembaut 
Free & Fair (V-Dem). Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into 
account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair? Responses: (0) No, not at all: the elections 
were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who 
became president; or who won the legislative majority); (1) Not really: while the elections allowed for some 
competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who 
won the legislative majority); (2) Ambiguous: there was substantial competition and freedom of participation but 
there were also significant irregularities; it is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or 
not; (3) Yes, somewhat: there were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the 
end affect the outcome; (4) Yes: there was some amount or human error and logistical restrictions but these were 
largely unintentional and without significant consequences. v2x_elfrfair 
Causal Factors 
GDPpc(ln).  Gross domestic product per capita, transformed by the natural logarithm, missing data interpolated 
within a time-series.  Source: Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014). e_migdppcln_ipo 
Corruption (V-Dem).  Includes indicators of corruption in the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the 
public sector at-large, aggregated with Bayesian factor analysis and then constructed as a historical stock with a 10% 
annual depreciation rate. v2x_icorr 
Land Inequality. A measure of land inequality, which combines the urbanization rate (Vanhanen 2003) with the 
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percentage of cultivated land area comprised by family farms (also Vanhanen 2003), according to the formula: (100-
[urbanization rate])*(100-[family farms]). land_inequality 
Diffusion variables. Diffusion of a variable for country X measured as a sum of that variable for all countries 
except country X, weighted by the distance (in kilometers) between the capital of each country and that of country 
X. [variable name]_geo 
Internal Conflict. Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The 
original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data 
contains only 1’s along with missing data (no 0’s). Following the authors’ instructions (personal communication), we 
re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series 
(which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1. Sources: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001), 
compiled by V-Dem. conflict_int 
External Conflict.  Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 
otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. 
However, the data contains only 1’s along with missing data (no 0’s). Following the authors’ instructions (personal 
communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the 
original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1. Sources: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing 
on Brecke (2001), compiled by V-Dem. conflict_ext 
Natural Resources. Dependence on natural resources, measured by revenues from oil, gas, coal, and metals as a 
percentage of GDP (Miller 2015). e_resdep2 
Urbanization.  Urban population divided by total population. Data on urban population and total population from 
Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu); missing data within a time-series interpolated using a linear model. urban_clio_ipo 
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Table A2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEMOCRACY INDICATORS      
Polity2 (Polity IV) 15,903 0.477 0.352 0 1 
UDS (Pemstein) 8,802 0.502 0.232 0 1 
Political Rights (FH) 6,986 0.537 0.374 0 1 
Civil Liberties (FH) 6,986 0.543 0.326 0 1 
Liberal Component (V-Dem) 16,992 0.438 0.280 0.000 0.984 
Participatory Component (V-Dem) 20,009 0.240 0.197 0.000 0.828 
Deliberative Component (V-Dem) 16,437 0.491 0.298 0.019 0.994 
Egalitarian Component (V-Dem) 16,509 0.490 0.295 0.021 0.993 
Individual Liberty/Rule of Law (V-Dem) 16,515 0.491 0.290 0.003 0.993 
Judicial Constraints (V-Dem) 16,333 0.493 0.290 0.010 0.986 
Legislative Constraints (V-Dem) 12,114 0.499 0.300 0.023 0.990 
Free Expression (V-Dem)  15,969 0.492 0.296 0.018 0.993 
Alternative Sources of Information (V-Dem) 15,986 0.493 0.305 0.033 0.989 
Free Association (V-Dem) 16,172 0.495 0.310 0.043 0.976 
Executive Selection (V-Dem) 16,358 0.518 0.483 0 1 
Adult Suffrage (V-Dem) 16,474 0.639 0.436 0 1 
BMR (Boix et al.) 15,739 0.317 0.465 0 1 
Lexical (Skaaning et al.) 18,142 0.457 0.391 0 1 
Competitive Elections (Skaaning) 18,142 0.347 0.476 0 1 
Electoral Contestation (V-Dem) 16,018 0.209 0.299 0 0.957 
Clean Elections (V-Dem) 16,317 0.309 0.333 0 0.989 
Government Intimidation (V-Dem) 16,325 0.202 0.900 -2.293 3.276 
Other Violence (V-Dem) 16,325 0.392 0.756 -2.163 2.615 
Vote Buying (V-Dem) 16,325 0.298 0.854 -1.900 2.776 
Other Irregularities (V-Dem) 16,325 0.189 0.864 -2.079 2.518 
Voter Registry (V-Dem) 16,325 0.257 0.831 -2.233 2.724 
EMB Capacity (V-Dem) 16,204 0.136 1.078 -1.742 3.210 
EMB Autonomy (V-Dem) 16,210 -0.090 1.138 -1.997 2.864 
Free & Fair (V-Dem) 16,317 0.167 0.978 -2.058 2.589 
CAUSAL FACTORS      
GDPpc (ln) 17,932 7.510 1.011 5.315 10.667 
Corruption index 16,403 0.518 0.284 0.014 0.986 
Land Inequality 9,764 5,040.182 2,474.755 0 9,603 
Internal Conflict 30,753 0.064 0.245 0 1 
External Conflict 30,753 0.098 0.297 0 1 
Natural Resources 13,541 3.560 9.714 0 100 
Urbanization rate 39,879 0.234 0.233 0.002 1 
Diffusion variables:      
    Polity2 (Polity IV) 40,660 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.100 
    UDS (Pemstein) 11,970 0.020 0.024 0.002 0.260 
    Political Rights (FH) 7,600 0.029 0.037 0.005 0.312 
    Civil Liberties (FH) 7,600 0.030 0.036 0.006 0.313 
    Liberal Component (V-Dem) 21,850 0.017 0.011 0.003 0.078 
    Participatory Component (V-Dem) 21,850 0.011 0.008 0.001 0.067 
    Deliberative Component (V-Dem) 21,850 0.018 0.013 0.003 0.107 
    Egalitarian Component (V-Dem) 21,850 0.018 0.013 0.002 0.081 
    Individual Liberty/Rule of Law (V-Dem) 21,850 0.018 0.012 0.003 0.084 
    Judicial Constraints (V-Dem) 21,850 0.018 0.011 0.004 0.075 
    Legislative Constraints (V-Dem) 21,850 0.014 0.011 0.002 0.096 
    Free Expression (V-Dem)  21,850 0.018 0.012 0.003 0.089 
    Alternative Sources of Information (V-Dem) 21,850 0.017 0.012 0.003 0.109 
    Free Association (V-Dem) 21,850 0.018 0.013 0.002 0.105 
    Executive Selection (V-Dem) 21,850 0.019 0.016 0.002 0.132 
    Adult Suffrage (V-Dem) 21,850 0.023 0.020 0.001 0.137 
    BMR (Boix et al.) 39,472 0.007 0.017 0.000 0.311 
    Lexical (Skaaning et al.) 40,660 0.011 0.022 0.000 0.315 
    Competitive Elections (Skaaning) 40,630 0.009 0.020 0.000 0.313 
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    Electoral Contestation (V-Dem) 21,850 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.053 
    Clean Elections (V-Dem) 21,850 0.012 0.010 0.000 0.065 
 
Democracy indices are normalized to 0-1, where 1=most democratic. 
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APPENDIX B:  Robustness Tests 
Table B1:  Liberal Component (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.003 0.074*** 0.048** 0.004 0.098***  0.018* 0.037*** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.023) (0.024) (0.004) (0.027)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.002) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.082**    
  L20      (0.036)    
Lagged Y 0.942***   0.935***   0.676*** 0.780*** 0.804*** 
 (0.005)   (0.009)   (0.025) (0.046) (0.021) 
Trend   0.002***       
   (0.000)       
Corruption    -0.014* -0.576***     
       (0.008) (0.111)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000***     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.217 4.742     
    (0.387) (2.989)     
Internal     -0.000 -0.019     
   Conflict    (0.003) (0.015)     
External     -0.001 -0.033**     
   Conflict    (0.003) (0.016)     
Natural     0.000 -0.001     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 154 154 154 132 132 154 154 154 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11571 11664 11664 6752 6752 10617 2288 2288 21143 
R2 (within) 0.920 0.288 0.187 0.900 0.384 0.301 0.616  0.905 
 
Outcome: Liberal Component index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of 
moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 
5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with 
the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side 
variables measured at T-1.   
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Table B2:  Participatory Component (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Y>0 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
GDPpc  -0.000 0.011 -0.001 0.001 0.058***  0.000 0.001 0.018** 0.000 
  (ln) (0.001) (0.014) (0.014) (0.002) (0.019)  (0.001) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) 
GDPpc       0.024     
  (ln) L20      (0.021)     
Lagged Y 0.957***   0.947***   0.956*** 0.739*** 0.812*** 0.890*** 
 (0.004)   (0.007)   (0.004) (0.024) (0.048) (0.013) 
Trend   0.003***        
   (0.000)        
Corruption    -0.008 -0.246***      
       (0.005) (0.069)      
Land     -0.000* -0.000***      
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)      
Diffusion    0.047 3.371      
    (0.234) (2.760)      
Internal     0.002 0.000      
   Conflict    (0.002) (0.008)      
External     -0.000 -0.023*      
   Conflict    (0.002) (0.013)      
Natural     -0.000 -0.001      
   Resources    (0.000) (0.000)      
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 159 159 159 132 132 160 155 159 159 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 111 22 22 114 
Obs 11998 12095 12095 6751 6751 10997 11545 2370 2370 21143 
R2 (within) 0.952 0.483 0.402 0.931 0.476 0.479 0.953 0.758  0.959 
 
Outcome: Participatory Component index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of 
moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 
Y>0 (scores for Participatory Component that surpass 0), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after 
constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  
Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.   
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Table B3:  Deliberative Component (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.001 0.056** 0.020 0.006 0.115***  0.011 0.034*** 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.027) (0.029) (0.005) (0.038)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.058    
  L20      (0.045)    
Lagged Y 0.943***   0.928***   0.668*** 0.767*** 0.798*** 
 (0.004)   (0.007)   (0.023) (0.039) (0.020) 
Trend   0.004***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    -0.018* -0.688***     
       (0.010) (0.142)     
Land     -0.000* -0.000***     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.170 4.893**     
    (0.280) (2.263)     
Internal     0.004 -0.009     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.021)     
External     -0.000 -0.033     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.022)     
Natural     -0.000 -0.001     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11449 11543 11543 6751 6751 10524 2262 2262 21143 
R2 (within) 0.930 0.361 0.274 0.901 0.396 0.363 0.654  0.864 
 
Outcome: Deliberative Component index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of 
moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 
5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with 
the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side 
variables measured at T-1.   
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Table B4:  Egalitarian Component (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) -0.001 0.012 0.022 0.000 0.006  -0.001 0.007 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.022) (0.020) (0.002) (0.028)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.006    
  L20      (0.031)    
Lagged Y 0.962***   0.963***   0.776*** 0.947*** 0.722*** 
 (0.003)   (0.005)   (0.016) (0.022) (0.027) 
Trend   0.005***       
   (0.000)       
Corruption    -0.008* -0.388***     
       (0.004) (0.070)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    -0.246* 0.261     
    (0.143) (2.234)     
Internal     0.005** 0.002     
   Conflict    (0.002) (0.011)     
External     0.002 -0.019     
   Conflict    (0.002) (0.014)     
Natural     0.000 0.001     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11447 11541 11541 6749 6750 10522 2261 2261 21143 
R2 (within) 0.972 0.611 0.595 0.970 0.686 0.631 0.849  0.878 
 
Outcome: Egalitarian Component index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of 
moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 
5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with 
the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side 
variables measured at T-1.    
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Table B5:  Individual Liberty/Rule of Law (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) -0.001 0.059** 0.036 0.000 0.099***  0.005 0.021** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.025) (0.026) (0.003) (0.029)  (0.010) (0.009) (0.002) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.068*    
  L20      (0.040)    
Lagged Y 0.961***   0.952***   0.738*** 0.873*** 0.799*** 
 (0.003)   (0.007)   (0.021) (0.044) (0.022) 
Trend   0.003***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    -0.004 -0.540***     
       (0.008) (0.129)     
Land     0.000 -0.000***     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.145 5.522*     
    (0.278) (3.196)     
Internal     0.002 -0.050***     
   Conflict    (0.003) (0.015)     
External     -0.001 -0.035**     
   Conflict    (0.003) (0.016)     
Natural     0.000 -0.001     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11449 11543 11543 6751 6751 10524 2262 2262 21143 
R2 (within) 0.944 0.324 0.230 0.915 0.380 0.327 0.690  0.893 
 
Outcome: Individual Liberty/Rule of Law index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method 
of moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available 
data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data 
imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. 
Right-side variables measured at T-1.    
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Table B6:  Judicial Constraints (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.004* 0.091*** 0.071*** 0.005 0.089***  0.020** 0.031*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.022) (0.021) (0.003) (0.025)  (0.009) (0.011) (0.002) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.099***    
  L20      (0.033)    
Lagged Y 0.956***   0.934***   0.753*** 0.918*** 0.737*** 
 (0.006)   (0.011)   (0.023) (0.041) (0.031) 
Trend   -0.000       
   (0.000)       
Corruption    -0.016** -0.521***     
       (0.008) (0.095)     
Land     -0.000** -0.000***     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.184 3.192     
    (0.238) (2.179)     
Internal     0.001 -0.006     
   Conflict    (0.003) (0.012)     
External     -0.002 -0.028*     
   Conflict    (0.003) (0.016)     
Natural     -0.000 -0.001     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11429 11524 11524 6751 6751 10524 2258 2258 21143 
R2 (within) 0.916 0.139 0.0801 0.887 0.304 0.154 0.606  0.894 
 
Outcome: Judicial Constraints index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), 
standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1.   
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Table B7:  Legislative Constraints (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.004 0.065* 0.027 0.006 0.082**  0.013 0.021* 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.033) (0.032) (0.005) (0.040)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.112**    
  L20      (0.045)    
Lagged Y 0.960***   0.956***   0.772*** 0.915*** 0.701*** 
 (0.004)   (0.006)   (0.022) (0.031) (0.025) 
Trend   0.002***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    -0.015 -0.626***     
       (0.011) (0.148)     
Land     0.000 -0.000***     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.118 5.846*     
    (0.381) (3.448)     
Internal     -0.001 0.014     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.023)     
External     -0.001 -0.039*     
   Conflict    (0.003) (0.021)     
Natural     -0.000 -0.001     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 9551 9839 9839 5834 5969 9133 1801 1801 21143 
R2 (within) 0.940 0.253 0.154 0.927 0.359 0.284 0.694  0.814 
 
Outcome: Legislative Constraints index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of 
moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 
5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with 
the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side 
variables measured at T-1.   
 
 
47 
Table B8:  Free Expression (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.001 0.077*** 0.031 0.003 0.145***  0.013 0.036*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.029) (0.033) (0.005) (0.042)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.002) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.090*    
  L20      (0.049)    
Lagged Y 0.958***   0.948***   0.717*** 0.821*** 0.802*** 
 (0.004)   (0.006)   (0.024) (0.043) (0.021) 
Trend   0.002***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    0.000 -0.577***     
       (0.007) (0.159)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000***     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.076 5.998*     
    (0.290) (3.275)     
Internal     0.002 -0.035*     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.020)     
External     -0.001 -0.054**     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.021)     
Natural     -0.000 -0.003**     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11244 11339 11339 6601 6605 10340 2221 2221 21143 
R2 (within) 0.939 0.292 0.127 0.915 0.348 0.305 0.657  0.864 
 
Outcome: Free Expression index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), 
standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1.  
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Table B9:  Alternative Sources of Information (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) -0.001 0.020 -0.023 0.003 0.120***  -0.000 0.028*** 0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.029) (0.032) (0.004) (0.040)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.039    
  L20      (0.049)    
Lagged Y 0.955***   0.945***   0.724*** 0.812*** 0.789*** 
 (0.004)   (0.006)   (0.026) (0.050) (0.022) 
Trend   0.003***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    0.004 -0.449***     
       (0.007) (0.154)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000***     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.309 6.712**     
    (0.321) (2.781)     
Internal     0.005 0.012     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.018)     
External     -0.001 -0.043**     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.020)     
Natural     -0.000 -0.003**     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11244 11339 11339 6601 6605 10340 2221 2221 21143 
R2 (within) 0.938 0.325 0.154 0.915 0.341 0.331 0.678  0.869 
 
Outcome: Alternative Sources of Information index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized 
method of moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all 
available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing 
data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. 
Right-side variables measured at T-1.  
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Table B10:  Free Association (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.001 0.044 -0.008 0.003 0.102**  0.010 0.031*** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.030) (0.033) (0.005) (0.043)  (0.014) (0.009) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.063    
  L20      (0.050)    
Lagged Y 0.951***   0.938***   0.673*** 0.730*** 0.800*** 
 (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.028) (0.059) (0.020) 
Trend   0.003***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    0.004 -0.533***     
       (0.009) (0.138)     
Land     -0.000** -0.000***     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    -0.093 4.624*     
    (0.296) (2.699)     
Internal     0.005 0.009     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.020)     
External     -0.003 -0.022     
   Conflict    (0.005) (0.022)     
Natural     -0.000 -0.001     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11226 11330 11330 6585 6605 10338 2202 2202 21143 
R2 (within) 0.932 0.315 0.131 0.907 0.346 0.346 0.627  0.870 
 
Outcome: Free Association index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), 
standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1.  
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Table B11:  Executive Selection (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.006 0.033 0.019 0.043*** 0.223***  -0.001 0.051** 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.042) (0.039) (0.015) (0.061)  (0.026) (0.022) (0.005) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.041    
  L20      (0.065)    
Lagged Y 0.849***   0.800***   0.476*** 0.466*** 0.757*** 
 (0.009)   (0.015)   (0.029) (0.039) (0.017) 
Trend   0.005***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    -0.059 -0.455**     
       (0.041) (0.175)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.256 3.436*     
    (0.688) (1.898)     
Internal     -0.027** -0.042     
   Conflict    (0.013) (0.031)     
External     -0.012 -0.040     
   Conflict    (0.010) (0.034)     
Natural     0.000 0.001     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11295 11402 11402 6716 6717 10394 2226 2226 21143 
R2 (within) 0.778 0.189 0.169 0.690 0.134 0.195 0.376  0.785 
 
Outcome: Executive Selection index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of 
moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 
5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with 
the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side 
variables measured at T-1.  
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Table B12:  Adult Suffrage (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) -0.007** -0.111*** -0.067** -0.009** -0.074*  -0.025** 0.001 -0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.030) (0.030) (0.004) (0.039)  (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) 
GDPpc (ln)      -0.087**    
  L20      (0.039)    
Lagged Y 0.922***   0.918***   0.664*** 0.736*** 0.776*** 
 (0.005)   (0.009)   (0.017) (0.028) (0.018) 
Trend   0.009***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    -0.015** -0.220**     
       (0.007) (0.093)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000*     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.042 1.181     
    (0.203) (2.252)     
Internal     0.006 0.024     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.020)     
External     -0.000 -0.005     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.020)     
Natural     0.000** 0.001*     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 11438 11532 11532 6750 6750 10513 2260 2260 21143 
R2 (within) 0.944 0.579 0.520 0.948 0.623 0.623 0.780  0.842 
 
Outcome: Mass Suffrage index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), 
standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1.  
 
 
52 
Table B13:  Polity2 (Polity IV) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.002 0.071** 0.021 0.008 0.094**  0.016 0.064*** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.032) (0.028) (0.006) (0.037)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.098**    
  L20      (0.039)    
Lagged Y 0.928***   0.893***   0.666*** 0.663*** 0.732*** 
 (0.006)   (0.010)   (0.029) (0.050) (0.022) 
Trend   0.003***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption          
             
Land     -0.019 -0.536***     
   Inequality    (0.016) (0.136)     
Diffusion    -0.000*** -0.000***     
    (0.000) (0.000)     
Internal     0.083 5.139**     
   Conflict    (0.442) (2.347)     
External     0.011** 0.037*     
   Conflict    (0.005) (0.021)     
Natural     -0.009 -0.028     
   Resources    (0.006) (0.026)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 155 155 155 132 132 156 154 154 216 
Years 211 211 211 99 99 193 42 42 213 
Obs 12676 12823 12823 6647 6666 11854 2465 2465 23445 
R2 (within) 0.912 0.354 0.275 0.845 0.282 0.355 0.655  0.798 
 
Outcome: Polity2 index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard 
errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1.  
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Table B14:  UDS (Pemstein) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.001 0.033* 0.003 0.003 0.026  0.012 0.054*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.016) (0.004) (0.023)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.025    
  L20      (0.026)    
Lagged Y 0.892***   0.869***   0.523*** 0.638*** 0.513*** 
 (0.009)   (0.012)   (0.044) (0.075) (0.022) 
Trend   0.003***       
   (0.000)       
Corruption    -0.022* -0.334***     
       (0.012) (0.081)     
Land     0.000 -0.000     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.378 4.417**     
    (0.317) (2.221)     
Internal     0.000 -0.009     
   Conflict    (0.003) (0.010)     
External     -0.004 0.001     
   Conflict    (0.003) (0.016)     
Natural     -0.000 -0.000     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 156 156 156 131 131 155 155 155 205 
Years 62 63 63 53 53 63 11 11 114 
Obs 7390 7538 7538 4840 4846 6883 1296 1296 21143 
R2 (within) 0.862 0.282 0.216 0.829 0.322 0.309 0.502  0.755 
 
Outcome: UDS index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard 
errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1.   
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Table B15:  Political Rights (FH) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) -0.004 0.008 -0.009 -0.022 -0.064  -0.002 0.092*** 0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.033) (0.031) (0.014) (0.050)  (0.021) (0.020) (0.005) 
GDPpc (ln)      -0.021    
  L20      (0.036)    
Lagged Y 0.849***   0.797***   0.436*** 0.652*** 0.481*** 
 (0.013)   (0.021)   (0.042) (0.064) (0.018) 
Trend   0.006***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    -0.067* -0.383**     
       (0.035) (0.173)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.186 0.661     
    (0.583) (2.660)     
Internal     -0.009 -0.057**     
   Conflict    (0.008) (0.028)     
External     -0.005 0.024     
   Conflict    (0.012) (0.033)     
Natural     0.001*** 0.003***     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 157 157 157 132 132 157 155 155 205 
Years 37 39 39 25 25 40 7 7 114 
Obs 5247 5540 5540 2746 2749 5733 994 994 21143 
R2 (within) 0.774 0.137 0.125 0.695 0.170 0.139 0.297  0.666 
 
Outcome: Political Rights index, inverted scale.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of 
moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 
5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with 
the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side 
variables measured at T-1. 
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Table B16:  Civil Liberties (FH) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.002 0.028 0.030 -0.018 -0.025  0.012 0.053*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.027) (0.025) (0.012) (0.043)  (0.017) (0.015) (0.004) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.012    
  L20      (0.031)    
Lagged Y 0.845***   0.791***   0.468*** 0.673*** 0.415*** 
 (0.012)   (0.018)   (0.035) (0.047) (0.019) 
Trend   0.005***       
   (0.001)       
Corruption    -0.014 -0.215     
       (0.023) (0.138)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.124 2.677     
    (0.631) (2.410)     
Internal     -0.006 -0.060***     
   Conflict    (0.007) (0.021)     
External     -0.001 -0.020     
   Conflict    (0.011) (0.031)     
Natural     0.001*** 0.002     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 157 157 157 132 132 157 155 155 205 
Years 37 39 39 25 25 40 7 7 114 
Obs 5247 5540 5540 2746 2749 5733 994 994 21143 
R2 (within) 0.788 0.179 0.154 0.685 0.126 0.182 0.416  0.663 
 
Outcome: Civil Liberties index, inverted scale.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of 
moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 
5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with 
the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side 
variables measured at T-1.  
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Table B17:  BMR (Boix et al.) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
GDPpc (ln) 0.007 0.109*** 0.084** 0.012 0.139**  1.400*** 0.046*** 
 (0.005) (0.041) (0.041) (0.010) (0.054)  (0.439) (0.008) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.175***   
  L20      (0.051)   
Lagged Y 0.904***   0.869***   2.268*** 0.507*** 
 (0.007)   (0.010)   (0.219) (0.029) 
Trend   0.003***      
   (0.001)      
Corruption    -0.068*** -0.821***    
       (0.025) (0.178)    
Land     -0.000* -0.000***    
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)    
Diffusion    1.237 9.517**    
    (0.749) (4.598)    
Internal     0.008 0.015    
   Conflict    (0.008) (0.029)    
External     -0.006 -0.034    
   Conflict    (0.006) (0.032)    
Natural     0.000 0.000    
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)    
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 156 156 156 132 132 155 76 216 
Years 207 207 207 99 99 187 41 213 
Obs 12232 12351 12351 6735 6737 11010 1550 23445 
R2 (within) 0.873 0.312 0.279 0.805 0.255 0.322  0.578 
 
Outcome: BMR index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard 
errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1. 
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Table B18:  Lexical (Skaaning) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GDPpc (ln) 0.010** 0.104*** 0.064** 0.016* 0.124***  0.040** 0.097*** 0.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.027) (0.025) (0.009) (0.037)  (0.017) (0.019) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.079**    
  L20      (0.037)    
Lagged Y 0.849***   0.814***   0.479*** 0.442*** 0.715*** 
 (0.010)   (0.014)   (0.037) (0.064) (0.017) 
Trend   0.003***       
   (0.000)       
Corruption    -0.069** -0.625***     
       (0.028) (0.142)     
Land     -0.000*** -0.000***     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    1.144* 6.447**     
    (0.665) (2.915)     
Internal     0.006 -0.015     
   Conflict    (0.009) (0.028)     
External     -0.003 -0.015     
   Conflict    (0.007) (0.024)     
Natural     -0.000 0.000     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 157 157 157 132 132 158 156 156 216 
Years 211 211 211 99 99 193 42 42 213 
Obs 12947 13081 13081 6683 6695 12053 2509 2509 23445 
R2 (within) 0.825 0.378 0.305 0.740 0.266 0.374 0.523  0.799 
 
Outcome: Lexical index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard 
errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1. 
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Table B19:  Electoral Contestation (V-Dem) 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Y>0 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
GDPpc (ln) 0.007** 0.095*** 0.069*** 0.014*** 0.147***  0.007** 0.025* 0.061*** 0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.022) (0.005) (0.026)  (0.003) (0.013) (0.014) (0.003) 
GDPpc (ln)      0.110***     
  L20      (0.033)     
Lagged Y 0.912***   0.893***   0.956*** 0.640*** 0.689*** 0.777*** 
 (0.008)   (0.010)   (0.006) (0.030) (0.056) (0.021) 
Trend   0.003***        
   (0.000)        
Corruption    -0.053*** -0.589***      
       (0.015) (0.112)      
Land     -0.000** -0.000***      
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)      
Diffusion    0.401 6.131*      
    (0.492) (3.600)      
Internal     -0.001 -0.010      
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.013)      
External     -0.003 -0.037**      
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.018)      
Natural     -0.000* -0.002**      
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)      
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 152 152 152 132 132 153 144 152 152 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 111 22 22 114 
Obs 11076 11193 11193 6551 6572 10212 7146 2168 2168 21143 
R2 (within) 0.900 0.395 0.338 0.884 0.465 0.411 0.915 0.643  0.875 
 
Outcome: Electoral Contestation index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of 
moments), standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 
Y>0 (scores for Electoral Contestation that surpass 0), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 
5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: 
country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1. 
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Table B20:  Urbanization and Competitive Elections 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Urbaniz 0.077*** 0.711*** 0.712*** 0.040 0.284  1.424 0.195*** 
 (0.026) (0.202) (0.164) (0.067) (0.326)  (1.767) (0.050) 
Urbaniz      0.648***   
   L20      (0.218)   
Lagged Y 0.892***   0.843***   2.243*** 0.577*** 
 (0.008)   (0.012)   (0.198) (0.031) 
Trend   0.001***      
   (0.000)      
Corruption    -0.090*** -0.797***    
       (0.031) (0.184)    
Land     -0.000 -0.000    
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)    
Diffusion    1.959** 9.613**    
    (0.899) (4.453)    
Internal     0.006 -0.023    
   Conflict    (0.010) (0.034)    
External     -0.007 -0.050    
   Conflict    (0.007) (0.035)    
Natural     0.000 0.001    
   
Resources 
   
(0.000) (0.002) 
   
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 188 188 188 135 135 188 95 213 
Years 211 211 211 99 99 193 42 216 
Obs 16165 16357 16357 7087 7101 16161 2063 23445 
R2 (within) 0.850 0.288 0.253 0.765 0.222 0.282  0.669 
 
Outcome: Competitive Elections index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), logit (conditional logit), standard 
errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1.  
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Table B21:  Urbanization and Clean Elections 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full 5-year 5-year MI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Urbaniz 0.034** 0.285** 0.305** 0.082*** 0.387**  0.155*** 0.265*** 0.062*** 
 (0.016) (0.128) (0.124) (0.030) (0.165)  (0.058) (0.058) (0.020) 
Urbaniz      0.275**    
   L20      (0.127)    
Lagged Y 0.897***   0.841***   0.636*** 0.622*** 0.742*** 
 (0.009)   (0.015)   (0.031) (0.061) (0.022) 
Trend   0.003***       
   (0.000)       
Corruption    -0.106*** -0.730***     
       (0.022) (0.122)     
Land     -0.000 -0.000     
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)     
Diffusion    0.632 4.357     
    (0.486) (2.829)     
Internal     -0.001 -0.013     
   Conflict    (0.005) (0.015)     
External     -0.002 -0.035*     
   Conflict    (0.004) (0.018)     
Natural     -0.000 -0.000     
   Resources    (0.000) (0.001)     
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü  ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Countries 160 160 160 135 135 160 160 160 205 
Years 111 112 112 99 99 115 22 22 114 
Obs 15011 15193 15193 7061 7081 15530 2926 2926 21143 
R2 (within) 0.873 0.354 0.320 0.820 0.401 0.365 0.611  0.856 
 
Outcome: Clean Elections index.  Estimators: OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), 
standard errors clustered by country.  *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests).  Sample: Full (all available data), 5-year (data 
aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia 
multiple imputation algorithm).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured 
at T-1. 
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Table B22:  Competitive Elections (logit models) 
Sample Full Full Full Full Full 5-year Full 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
GDPpc (ln) 0.945*** 1.749*** 0.194 1.691*** 2.649*** 1.682***  
 (0.334) (0.463) (0.383) (0.428) (0.611) (0.508)  
GDPpc (ln),        2.263*** 
   L20       (0.705) 
Lagged Y 6.338***   5.900***  2.345***  
 (0.252)   (0.358)  (0.269)  
Trend   0.054***     
   (0.010)     
Corruption    -5.131*** -11.125***   
       (1.272) (2.264)   
Land     -0.000 -0.000   
   Inequality    (0.000) (0.000)   
Diffusion    106.088*** 141.724**   
    (40.382) (67.440)   
Internal     0.397 -0.034   
   Conflict    (0.414) (0.446)   
External     -0.571 -0.854*   
   Conflict    (0.503) (0.502)   
Natural     0.028 0.004   
   Resources    (0.019) (0.044)   
Country FE ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Year FE ü ü  ü ü ü ü 
Countries 86 87 89 60 60 78 82 
Years 152 152 211 99 99 31 154 
Obs 7351 7434 8831 3842 3848 1370 6910 
R2 (pseudo) 0.827 0.519 0.502 0.802 0.559 0.562 0.529 
Log likelihood -839.2 -2363 -2857 -517.4 -1154 -396.6 -2198 
 
Outcome: Competitive Elections index.  Logistic regression, standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 
(two-sided tests).  Units of analysis: country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.   
